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Karl von Clausewitz once observed that a nation will fight a war in a way 
dictated by its social system. Militarist regimes presumably will organize 
professional military ventures; democratic regimes, democratic military ven- 
tures. Obviously the generalization is subject to the limits of all generaliza- 
tions, but it has some validity. CIausewitz spoke of Europe in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, but the United States may offer the best case study 
of his thesis. American wars have always had a curiously American quality. 
From the colonial wars through the American Revolution, the War of 
18 12, and the Mexican War, Americans were probably the most individualis- 
tic soldiers in the field. They soon developed an irritating tradition of initia- 
tive, shared a passion for good shooting, and had a special spirit. Doubtless 
the militia system contributed to the independence of America's troops- 
most of them were temporary soldiers serving just long enough to make 
home safe for families and neighbors. But the structure of the country 
contributed something to the spirit of the martial forces. Young, zealous, 
eager for world acceptance, America strove for importance with a zest dor- 
mant in older countries. Hope and optimism mixed with boorish truculence 
distinguished the Yankees. 
A loosely knit union was presided over by a loosely knit federal system, 
reflecting the individualist American character. Powers reserved were more 
important than powers conferred. Presidents governed by consent and by 
personal suasion. Voices of centralism, such voices as those of Alexander 
Hamilton and John Marshall, were few and often drowned out by the 
prevailing Jeffersonian sentiment, "that government is best which governs 
least." So it was not surprising that the army, and especially the militia, were 
loosely knit. Officers were listened to, obeyed when they appeared to be 
right, but ignored when the situation demanded, Proud men who worked for 
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themselves expected to fight for themselves, and frequently knew more about 
fighting in the woodlands than did gilded dandies from the drillfield. Leader- 
ship was a common trait-sometimes too common! 
Early American conflicts appear to have had little direct effect on the 
nature of the country, but the national character continued to affect war. 
Even the so-called "imperialistic" adventure in Mexico in the 1840's was 
more a reflection of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny than a creator of it. 
A new facet to conflict, however, can be seen in retrospect emerging from 
the Mexican War. Young graduates of West Point served effectively, helped 
to bring order out of staff chaos, and showed (to any who bothered to look) 
a new professional element in American armies. The army regulars had been 
the backbone of the Continental and 1812 legions-but professional officers 
were another matter. However, the implications of a growing officer cadre 
went unnoticed by all save professional soldiers. The union remained the 
same during and after the Mexican War, although its ambitions may have 
changed. 
In 1861 the union was largely what it had been a dozen years before: a 
loosely knit collection of states, each jealous of its rights, and all presided 
over by a federal administration steeped in politics as the art of the possible 
and in power as a personal game. Sectionalism had appeared; the South 
lurked in increasing rancor behind fears, rumors, and a cotton curtain; the 
West focused on new lands in the Indian nations, traded with the South 
down the Mississippi and with the North by burgeoning lines of railroad. The 
North, expecially the northeast, cherished its own morally self-congratulato- 
ry Americanism, kept a cool trading eye to the sea, deplored the backward- 
ness of the West, and scolded the South for the shame of slavery. 
Arguments about the causes of the Civil War are endless and will contin- 
ue; they are unimportant to the issue of war and union. What is important 
is the fact of war. It brought a shift of political realities not at first recognized, 
but real. In the North the old federal triangle of governmental branches 
functioning in amiable concert changed to a pyramid of power with the 
executive on top. By I862 Abraham Lincoln had become a strong war 
president, ready to change the nature of his country to preserve its form. 
More surprisingly, the South underwent a similar shift. 
Jefferson Davis was called by the Confederacy to preside over a country 
conceived in state rights and dedicated to individualism. Few men were more 
obviously qualified to lead a conservative reaction. Davis's entire career had 
been shaped in the shadow of John Calhoun; his thought, his temperament, 
his heart were dedicated to Southern rights, the protection of slavery, and 
the dignity of land, tradition, and lineage. Had history permitted him to 
follow his heart, it would have assured him greatness. But history made him 
a man alien to his time, cast him against the truest product of the age, and 
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so doomed him to a loser's mite. He deserves far more than that, for he did 
what few can manage; he changed himself entirely to fit the presidency, 
Lincoln grew with his job, as all attest; Davis took on another character, and 
wore it well. He became an advocate of hard war, of organization, of subli- 
mated individualism. Against strident state rights governors the Confederate 
President waged a campaign of nationalism - to the point of urging conscrip- 
tion, impressment of private property, harsh taxation, restriction of cotton 
acreage, voluntary price controls, and finally the use of slaves as Southern 
soldiers. 
Conscription worked its peculiar social alchemy in both Union and 
Confederacy. Urban sophisticates and city toughs, backwoods bumpkins 
and rustics mixed in the two armies until a different citizenry peopled 
north and south by the end of the war. Armies were more than human 
mixers, they were virtually insatiable consumers. Sustaining the armies 
caused some of the greatest changes in both warring nations. 
Logistics is now a common noun. In the 1860's it was scarcely recog- 
nizable as English. But the science it describes-the arming, provisioning, 
healing, transporting, sheltering, clothing, paying of troops in the field- 
was understood as the housekeeping facet of the art of war. Such duties 
were done by well-established War Department staff officers: ordnance 
men, quartermasters, commissaries, medical officers. In previous wars, 
these activities had not involved the staffs or the country in especially 
stupendous activities, even in time of combat. But the Civil War demand- 
ed more than any previous war. Masses of men created mass demands 
for everything. Old techniques of supply were simply inadequate. 
Both armies tried to cope with mass by mass. More men were added 
to the traditional staffs until bureaucracy created its own inertia. The 
demands increased relentlessly. Both nations knew the urgent and grow- 
ing need of more food production, of expanding munitions factories, of 
new stocks of money and of men. The South suffered most because of 
its weakness. The urgency of mass tested the weakest first and forced 
President Davis and his administration to previously unknown methods 
of mobilization and deployment. A strongly democratic Southland meta- 
morphosed, before the war ended, into a strongly organized power state 
with almost every sinew strained to sustain the armies. First the men 
went, then the silks, wines, salt, window sash weights, gold jewelry, fam- 
ily hunting guns, sabers from past wars, then hopes and ambitions-even 
the basis of the social order, slavery, stood jeopardized by the one great 
aim, independence. 
Weakness had one virtue; it made innovation necessary. President 
Davis experimented with unique theories of geographical and theater 
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command in the field; he called on citizens for ideas and for improve- 
ments; and he expanded the civilian employee list of the central govern- 
ment until much of the war was run by a nascent civil service (an especially 
American concept of civil control of the military). 
In the urge to help the armies, the South was forced into fundamental 
change, social, political, and economic. New business methods were tried in 
quartermaster activities-new accounting procedures, new warehousing 
methods, even new materials for shoes and clothing. New governmental 
methods were tested. The president, always an essentially private person, 
experimented with public suasion in frequent speeches and appearances. 
Virtually a second government was established in the Trans-Mississippi area, 
where a general presided over most civil and all military activities. Some 
things Davis could not do in the governmental sphere, among them declare 
martial law without recourse to Congress. He recognized that some consti- 
tutional forms had to be preserved, or there would be no reason for making 
war. 
In the end, all of the innovation, all of the effort and devotion failed, and 
the South lost. But losing, itself, became an important innovation, an impor- 
tant precedent. Americans had never lost a war. Southern experience added 
to the totality of difference between sections. Certain things survived in the 
South; a tradition of duty "faithfully performed"; a sense of history; a 
veneration of heroes; some of the techniques in business and government 
that had been used during the conflict; and especially the independent spirit 
which made Rebel soldiers, in the words of a Federal general, "that incompa- 
rable infantry." These surviving elements were important, for they made 
reunion more possible than most people imagined. As the South had become 
a modest industrial state, as it had adopted much of the aura of its hated 
Leviathan neighbor, it had lurched into modern times, had approached 
accommodation with the methods and morals of the North. 
All of the experiences of the South except defeat were shared by the North, 
and they were all magnified. Lincoln learned at last to use his power directly 
and effectively to mobilize the awesome resources of the United States and 
to aim them southward. When he found Ulysses Grant to use the North's 
resources, he had the combination for victory. But victory took long, bloody 
years, for it demanded the harnessing of untapped energies, demanded new 
tools and techniques and ideas. Victory required a vastly different Union. 
And when victory came at last at Appomattox the Union was markedly 
different from the amorphous thing of 1861. 
Conscription, commandeering, harsh taxation, price controls, the use of 
Negro soldiers, and restriction of freedom of speech, press, and person, all 
had a part in victory. A nation passionately devoted to democracy became 
at least partially totalitarian by 1865. State governments werejealous of their 
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"rights," but subordinated some of them to the national purpose. The Feder- 
al courts sustained President Lincoln's war efforts through a series of impor- 
tant civil rights decisions. And yet the North was only partly touched by the 
war. Vast superiority of manpower, money, and all resources made it possi- 
ble for the North to pursue the war while also carrying on the westward 
movement, the development of railroads, and the exploitation of virgin land. 
Meanwhile the South was bankrupted for generations. 
In some ways the war soiled as it touched the North. Along with victorious 
columns scourging the South went carpetbaggers and Treasury Agents, min- 
ions of reform loosed to license, men whose new morality taught freedmen 
the lowest white politics and ideals. These "new men" set a tone for Recon- 
struction which rankles to this day. Yet they were transitory and the evils 
they did were overshadowed by the changes in the Union, changes that 
finally touched and included the South. 
Even tied to the starveling South, the United States in 1865 stood on the 
threshold of world power unguessed and unknown. War had loosed its 
energies of mind and treasure, had given it ambitions and hungers beyond 
itself. From almost every standpoint, the Civil War may be called the "War 
of American Unification." 
As such, the Civil War fitted into the pattern of the nineteenth century, 
a century rocked by conflicts of unification in Europe, South America, even 
Canada. Would the Civil War, like some of the other unification upheavals, 
lead to repression and increased totalitarianism, or would it lead to greater 
nationalism? The answer depended on the depth of political, economic, and 
social change effected during the war years. 
Politically, the war settled a long-standing question of ultimate authority 
in the Union. President Lincoln's willingness to bend the Constitution, to 
take executive initiative when crisis demanded, his certainty that ends jus- 
tified means, lent new power to his office. Rarely in the future would there 
be any question of who ran the country. 
Under Lincoln, party development had languished. The Republicans, 
however, retained their structure and were able, in the Reconstruction era, 
to consolidate their dominant position in politics. Radicals took places of 
profit and precedence all over the South; they engineered much Federal 
action, and they possessed a sense of rectitude beyond the boundaries of 
their virtues. 
Economically, the Republican Party showed during the war tendencies 
toward using Federal authority to benefit special interests, and in the years 
after the war the tendencies increased. National legislation fostered business 
and capital, and who would deny the right of this course? The nation pros- 
pered, all save the old Confederacy, and success was enlarged as a brand of 
Americanism, 
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Social changes brought by the war were harder to see-all save emancipa- 
tion-but just as real as political and economic ones. The armies created a 
new democratic spirit; comradeship in blood sundered old class lines. Ability 
opened doors to many who would never have had a chance for achievement 
before the fighting. In the afterwar years ability mixed with success as 
touchstones to advancement. Accumulation of things showed ability; suc- 
cess could be quantified and a new ladder of acceptance was constructed. 
The Gilded Age glorified the rich and called them wellborn. 
So it was possible to see in the aftermath of civil war a distressing trend 
toward the tawdry and the crass in America. But the image was false. Avarice 
may have guided some, greed may have twisted ambition in others, but 
America remained true to its promise of freedom. War taught Americans the 
horrors of carnage. Especially the South learned the lesson of a depleted, 
maimed, broken generation; the North shared in legions of armless, legless, 
limping veterans. On both sides of the old lines the fighting spirit ebbed. 
American troops kept the field in tiny numbers. They fought on against 
the Indians; but these conflicts were remote, local, and of little impact on 
national life--distant "police actions" demanded by western settlers. Not 
until the 1890's did war fever burn in the country again. In 1898 President 
McKinley led the United States into war against Spain. Historians look back 
in laughter at the Spanish-American War, a misfit among conflicts, a Lillipu- 
tian venture by the American martial giant. At the time, though, laughter was 
rare. 
The Spanish-American War may well deserve the label of the First Mod- 
ern War, an epithet often reserved to the Civil War because of its trenches, 
weapons, strategies, and size. By comparison, the Spanish-American War 
lacked everything. But it was generated by propaganda, was waged in earnest 
anger against repressive Spain, set lasting precedents of policy, and took 
years to win. 
The Cuban phase proved only a small part of the huge problem created 
by the war. Campaigning in Cuba had a hilarious quality of mismanaged 
athletics to it; the game was won finally by toughness and bravery right up 
front. But so unequal a contest scarcely counted as war. And considering 
Cuba alone, William Randolph Hearst's hope for a limited skirmish and a 
good hunting season seemed reasonable. With victory in Cuba, though, came 
victory in the Philippines over the hapless Spanish caretakers. 
"Victory" in the Philippines turned into a nightmare of lingering guerilla 
warfare against Emilio Aguinaldo's patriots. The Filipinos had resisted the 
Spanish; they resisted American occupation in a continuing quest for inde- 
pendence. For almost a decade this wasting combat continued; casualties 
were a constant statistic in the annual report of the American Secretary of 
War, Finally "pacification" could be announced, but the cost might well be 
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reckoned prohibitive. The Philippine Insurrection, as it came to be known, 
tested the will of American occupying troops, taught them hard lessons 
in guerilla war and equally hard lessons in military-civilian relations. 
For the Union, the Philippine Insurrection had some long-range impli- 
cations. Experiences in the Far East whetted American appetite for a 
voice in that part of the world and helped to set Open Door views, but 
more than that, provided a precedent for colonial occupation policies. 
A problem which constantly plagued American diplomats and military 
governors was whether or not the Constitution of the United States 
protected native populations. Did the Constitution follow the flag? In the 
Philippines, the answer apparently was yes and no. The Constitution pro- 
tected and obligated occupiers, but local laws governed the occupied 
areas. This blend of American and native customs often proved admira- 
ble and set a tone of friendship rare between conquerors and conquered. 
It was an example of Yankee ingenuity and the essential goodwill of 
Americans. But not everything about the occupation was good, nor was 
everything about the new colonial system. Success in occupation may 
have been the worst defeat suffered by American forces. It made them 
satisfied and confident, even greedy. Success in Philippine relations gave 
a kind of "white man's burden" tone to later American colonial ventures. 
Americans did so well that they felt an obligation to uplift "deprived" 
peoples elsewhere. It was a human, though sad, urge. 
Success in the Philippines had direct effect on the American economy. 
It opened much of the Far Eastern market, directed trade and people 
still further westward, and appeared to be the way toward endless pros- 
perity. There were military results, too, worthy of note. The United States 
Army had won again, not easily, but it had won. American naval forces 
had had a decisive role in the Philippine war. If America wanted to keep 
her colonial empire, strong military forces were essential. The point was 
not lost on such Far Eastern advocates as Presidents Theodore Roosevelt 
and William Howard Taft. Under their careful eyes the United States 
Navy became a world force. 
The legacy of the Spanish-American War was imperialism, a new sense 
of American mission, and a willingness to participate in world power 
politics. Once in the colonial game, America would not be shouldered 
out by lesser nations. 
Imperialistic ideas affected a wide spectrum of people. Even archliberal 
Woodrow Wilson did not escape the spell. After he assumed the presi- 
dency in 1912, he launched a series of "involvements" around the Gulf 
and Caribbean which took U.S. Marines to many foreign shores as 
"regulators." Truly the purpose was to bring order out of local chaos, but 
such paternalism is resented. The trend of these island and Central 
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American intrusions was accelerated when trouble erupted between the 
United States and Mexico. 
Revolutionary events in Mexico created havoc in US.-Mexican border 
areas. Bands of Mexican desperadoes plundered both sides of the boundary. 
Such raids were irksome but tolerable until, at last, a large bandit force- 
allegedly led by Pancho Villa-struck Columbus, New Mexico on March 16, 
1916. Not only were townspeople terrorized, but a unit of the U.S. cavalry 
was embarrassingly surprised. Some sort of reply had to be made, and it took 
the form of the Punitive Expedition, led by General John J. Pershing. 
As a reaction against insult, the Punitive Expedition proved remarkably 
mild. It was an intrusion permitted by the Mexican government, but it was 
nonetheless a disgusting Yankee violation of Mexican sovereignty. Pershing 
operated under the strongest prohibitions ever put upon an independent 
American commander, and he never violated them. Restricted to north- 
south roads, denied use of the railroads, dependent on local approval before 
entering Mexican towns, Pershing kept his temper, and hence possibly avoid- 
ed war with Mexic-which was even more important than catching the 
elusive Villa. 
Pershing and his men played another important role-testing American 
equipment for possible use in modern war. Airplanes, machine guns, field 
radios, motor trucks, all supported Pershing's campaign. Many of these 
newfangled additions to field operations proved worthless, others needed 
modifications. 
Most obviously in need of modification was the creaking militia system. 
Thousands of national guardsmen were mobilized from far parts of the 
Union and sent to Texas in case of a real war. Getting these men in the field, 
transporting and feeding and equipping them, proved tasks beyond the 
competence or technique of guard logisticians. Scandals reminiscent of the 
Spanish-American War supply fiasco alarmed the country, and especially 
the War Department. Nothing about the mobilization process could be 
counted modern-all of it required improvement. 
All of this rattled a nation looking with alarm at the huge European War. 
Since August 1914, countless thousands of Central Powers and Allied troops 
faced each other along more than four hundred miles of trenches from the 
Channel coast of France to the Franco-Swiss border. War in Europe had 
evolved into some monstrous unknown, a thing of mire and misery, without 
maneuver, without relief, even without hope. Men were consumed in ghastly 
quantities for no more reward than a few scarred acres or some useless reach 
of wire and gulch. Victory remained the aim of the contenders, but ways to 
win it were lost in a desperate craze for a "breakthrough"-somehow a 
breakthrough became congruent with winning. But the breakthrough never 
came. All that came was waste. 
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America looked on this gargantuan stalemate in horror. All traditions, all 
tokens of grace so long cherished by the old world were being ground away 
in a war that seemed likely to go on until only the dead remained. Hopes 
and beliefs were sloughing in a world tragically changed. America remained 
aloof under Wilson's leadership. He sought a way to mediate the war before 
it ruined humanity. But mediation works only when exhaustion lends it 
virtue, and neither contending side would admit exhaustion. 
By the time Pershing crossed the last of his men back into Texas from 
Mexico in February 1917, relations between the United States and the Cen- 
tral Powers had deteriorated. Submarine warfare loomed as the great issue, 
along with the outrage of the Zimmerman Telegram. In April the United 
States declared war on Germany and her allies. Wilson tried every avenue 
of escape before he reluctantly accepted arms, but at length he was con- 
vinced that no other course lay open to America. He saw victory for the 
Central Powers as an end to freedom. America must fight for the heritage 
of western civilization. 
World War I should rank as probably the greatest agent of change in the 
twentieth century. Every participating nation emerged from the war starkly 
different. Even neutrals did not escape the war's lasting effects. 
Simply in terms of casualties the war changed the world. Ten million 
people were killed in or because of it; countless billions in treasure were 
poured into the conflict; an entire generation disappeared. There were sub- 
tler prices exacted by the war, prices of spirit. People had believed in progress 
and perfectibility before the fighting began; afterwards the prevailing mood 
was cynical and despairing. 
Outwardly untouched, America suffered acutely from its brief involve- 
ment. More than a million "doughboys" journeyed to France. Thousands 
took part in the campaigns of late 1917 and 1918, and it was possible to 
believe that America had tipped the balance for Allied victory. But victory 
came at an awkward moment for the United States. It caught America 
almost in mid-stride. At a point of unfinished mobilization, at a time of 
mounting unity and fervor, just at the peak of patriotism, the war was over. 
Suddenly there was no need for unity, fervor, or patriotism. Peace brought 
an almost cruel letdown. Victory lacked savor. 
Peace affected America in many things beyond spirit and attitude. The 
economy, geared to rising production of food and munitions, went awry with 
the sudden stoppage of demand. Farmers who had expanded their acreage 
in response to patriotic summons found themselves saddled with mortgaged 
lands and dwindling markets for crops. Industries found their new tooling 
almost useless for civilian production. Thousands who had worked in war 
plants were thrown abruptly out of work. A general recession set in, a 
recession of economy and will followed by reaction and fear. 
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A. Mitchell Palmer and the Red Scare set the tone of reaction. Uncertain- 
ty, disunity, lost purpose all made a new Native Americanism acceptable. 
Bolsheviks were conjured under myriad chairs and tables and the threat 
created an atmosphere of repression not unlike the era of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. But these hysterical results of the war were temporary. Other 
results were lasting. 
Logistics exploded to a new scale during World War I. Every participant 
had been forced to use new methods to supply millions of armed men. A 
steady sequence of supplies had to move to the Western Front and to the 
other scattered combat zones. Demands on national resources were tremen- 
dous and required new means of meeting them. Rationing of food and 
consumer goods, curtailment of international commerce, special war tax- 
ation, government control of the means of production and distribution were 
essential to the new logistics. 
In America, the new logistics intruded government deeply into personal 
Iives, and government never really got out again. Railroads were returned 
to private owners in time, rationing ended, commerce resumed, taxes were 
adjusted, but a new order of regimentation remained. The best evidence of 
this regimentation was an entirely new dimension of the Federal administra- 
tion-the myriad boards, panels, and commissions which had been created 
to supemise munitions production, farm development, rationing, allocation 
of manpower and other critical materials. These adjuncts of federalism were 
the modern equivalent of the civilian employees of the Northern and South- 
ern War Departments who helped run the Civil War. The "alphabet agen- 
cies" were different, however, in that they persisted and often made policy, 
even legislated through administrative decision, and so constituted a fourth 
dimension of government. 
World War I pushed America to new heights of organization and power. 
When the war ended, the United States was unquestionably the strongest 
nation on earth. And in the twentieth century it proved impossible to elude 
the role of leadership fostered by strength. But America tried desperately to 
evade the inevitable. 
Through the 1920's and into the '30's American diplomats either avoided 
foreign entanglements or worked to support disarmament and peace treaties. 
The carnage of 19 14- 19 1 8 had disillusioned America more thoroughly than 
many guessed and led to rejection of force as an instrument of policy. This 
isolation syndrome was reinforced by the severe depression of 1929. All 
kinds of Americans sold apples, pins, needles, or ties on streetcorners, but 
veterans got the publicity. Countless pictures showed the old uniforms, 
frayed and patched, the thin faces of former heroes, faces that held fear for 
an unseen enemy. The war to make the world safe for Democracy appeared 
to have made it unsafe for humanity. 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt's advent on the political scene lifted the pall of 
inertia. His frenetic hundred days helped to restore confidence in government 
as an instrument of protection, and his programs of economic andsocial reform 
pointed toward national rejuvenation. The techniques he used to sustain his 
program were frequently inherited from the World War. The "alphabet agen- 
cies" were increased; the Civilian Conservation Corps had a distinctly militar- 
istic form; the nation was enlistedin a crusade in which everyone "did his part." 
In spite of FDR, or because of him, the depression faded and the United 
States resumed the path of progress. When World War I1 erupted in Europe in 
1939, the United States was internally sound and externally weak. 
After World War I, the armed forces went into limbo. Small standing units 
of the army and navy diminished through the depression budgets, and even 
FDR found little money to give them. If the United States became militarily 
involved again, its armed forces would have to build from nothing. 
Some things were remembered from the hectic days of 1917. Voices for 
preparedness were raised, and in 1940 the United States adopted the Selective 
Service System-a remarkable peacetime departure from custom. Gradual 
preparations were made to expand the armed forces if necessary. Stockpiles of 
criticalmaterial were started. More than that, FDRworked actively to assist the 
Allies. The "destroyer deal" of 1940 which sent someold U.S. ships to theBritish 
indicated American sympathy with the Allied cause. But the country shrank 
from open involvement. Neutrality with bias seemed our best course-and it 
proved as difficult to maintain as in 1916 and 1917. 
When in December 1941 Japan attacked the United States, Germany came 
to the aid of her ally and declared war on America. Unlike the situation in 19 17, 
America was faced in 1941 with waging a two-front, global war. By that time 
American preparations had progressed far enough to permit orderly and fairly 
swift expansion. But such massive effort demanded energies and devotion not 
required in World War I. In the next four years, nearly thirteen million Ameri- 
cans joined the colors, thousands died or were wounded in battles that raged 
from Alaska to the Japanese home islands, from the Atlantic coast to Berlin. 
And when Germany and Japan surrendered in 1945, the United States once 
more ranked as the strongest nation on earth. 
There were interesting parallels in America's postwar experiences in 1918 
and 1945. Postwar depression of spirit marked both years; decisive military 
victory brought indecisive diplomacy; great unity gave way to disillusion and 
cynicism. In 1945 there was little thought of a world safe for democracy, but the 
goal of the war had been achieved; fascism faded as the blight of the world. 
Hitler and his henchmen joined history's toppled conquerors. The elimination 
of Hitler andNazismmade World War I1 clearly ajustum bellurn for America. 
Americans fight well in just wars; this is a facet of the American character, 
Effects of World War I1 on thenature of the Union were remarkably similar 
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to the effects of World War I. The scope of governmental authority burgeoned; 
agencies multiplied; the economy grew and developed under careful man- 
agement. Resources were found and exploited which were unknown before 
the war. New production methods transformed the munitions, aircraft, and 
shipping industries. Transportation entered a new era of speed and efficien- 
cy- 
There were other disturbing parallels, especially in the erosion of idealism. 
Two world conflicts pretty well destroyed illusions of virtue. Society seemed 
a tissue of deceit and politics a system of exploitation. Force alone made 
right. A new Red Scare, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the Cold War set 
the tone of Post-World War I1 reaction. There were some American voices 
of hope, calling the United States to assume world leadership and so restore 
some idealism. Twice within twenty-five years the United States had gone 
to war to save the western world. No other nation had so clear a record of 
rectitude. No other nation could really exercise leadership. So the United 
States took on the difficult role of Superpower. It requires the cajoling, 
persuading, and humoring of fractious allies, the balancing of terror; but it 
is a role brought by war and which uses war as a deterrent. 
So the Union has changed, because of conflict, from the Ioose-limbed 
corpus of 1861 to the modem structure of 1972. After World War 11, the 
trends toward centralization seen after each of America's wars increased. 
The strength and organization generated by the two World Wars made 
possible the growth of the United States in wealth, success, and power, made 
possible the reasonably effortless "police action" in Korea (another justum 
bellum in the eyes of most Americans), and also made possible the far-flung 
imperial outposts of today. They made possible, too, the Viet Nam effort, 
which continues against heavy domestic opposition-perhaps because it is 
not demonstrably a justum bellum. 
In 1945 the portents were evident that the United States stood on the 
threshold of world influence. Today it stands in the vortex of dominion 
because the union has changed to meet the challenge of force. Once a thing 
of localism and isolation, the Union now is a factory of power. 
History may record the twentieth century as important for the changes in 
the Union; may record the century as developing three militarist superstates. 
If so, history will surely remark the curious blend of war and idealism that 
spans the career of the United States. 
